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Board Diversity Requirements: Comparison of US and European Law
Abstract
Corporations are run for the benefit of their shareholders. However, shareholders can be
benefitted in a variety of ways, including through a corporate management strategy that considers
environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) measures in their policy. One ESG policy
that has been shown to create more value for shareholders is increasing board diversity. With
financial benefits as their justification, US stock exchanges and state governments, along with
European governments, have implemented board member diversity quotas concerning gender,
racial, and/or ethnic diversity requirements. The US has largely used stock exchanges, with the
exception of California laws, in order to require these disclosures, whereas European
governments have taken on the challenge themselves. Further, racial and ethnic diversity does not
have the same disclosure requirements in Europe as it does in the US.
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I.

Introduction
Corporations are supposed to operate for the benefit of their stockholders. This means

that the decisions that corporate board of directors make need to ultimately lead, or reasonably be
believed to lead, to shareholder benefits, namely by increasing stock price of public companies.
The board and officers of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders.1 On August 19,
2019, Business Roundtable released a statement signed by 181 Chief Executive Officers
regarding the purpose of a corporation. They stated a commitment to operate their companies for
the benefit of all stakeholders in the company, including customers, employees, suppliers,
communities, and shareholders.2 While this statement could be viewed as controversial because
corporations are supposed to operate for the benefit of the shareholder, there is another
prominent view that the statement is rather meaningless. The view is essentially that the CEO’s
are agreeing to maximize shareholder value through the benefits they instead to give to other
stakeholders. This is because shareholders increasingly have been assigning more value to
companies that implement policies that value other stakeholders. The law still requires that
companies operate for the benefit of their shareholders.
This occurs because investors are socially conscious and are therefore taking
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors into account when looking at companies.
“Environmental criteria consider how a company performs as a steward of nature. Social criteria
examine how it manages relationships with employees, suppliers, customers, and the
communities where it operates. Governance deals with a company’s leadership, executive pay,
audits, internal controls, and shareholder rights.”3 While the 2018 Business Roundtable letter
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Gary Shorter, Corporate Governance: Board Diversity, Congressional Research Service (2019).
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All
Americans’, Business Roundtable, Aug. 19, 2019.
3
The Investopedia Team, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Criteria, Investopedia, Feb. 23, 2022.
2
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largely applies to the “S” in ESG, the other factors are increasingly important to investors as
well. However, a focus on aspects such as ESG is not a new development. Over 50 years ago,
Milton Friedman wrote about social responsibility of businesses as tied to profits, and this
conversation is even more at the forefront today with the quickly changing emphasis on
environmental protection.4 Despite the 2019 letter, some feel as though the “S” and “G” were
falling behind the “E” factors in today’s discussion.5 Others, such as the CEO of Blackrock think
that the distinction between the terms is not as stark, because, for example, “E” and “S” strongly
correlate when low-income communities are most impacted by climate change.6
This paper will largely focus on an overlap between the “S” and “G” factors of ESG.
There has been a renewed reckoning since 2020 with the truth of American racism and the
systemic oppression of racially diverse populations. This movement, spurred by the death of
George Floyd, has created a worldwide movement for equality. Investors are very concerned
with addressing this in corporate America, and have turned largely toward diversity
requirements, or at least metrics, in companies to help effect change and to provide opportunities
where they were previously denied.
Investors are not the only ones demanding this change, as this paper will explore a series
of regulations and laws promoting board diversity. Congressional and policy interests have also
been sparked into this topic over the last decade or so.7 These diversity requirements for
underrepresented minorities have largely followed a push for gender diversity on corporate
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Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, The New York Times Magazine,
Sep. 13, 1970.
5
John Hale & Lisa Woll, Let’s Not Leave Behind the S & G in ESG, Morning Star, Apr. 22, 2021.
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Id.
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boards. Both underrepresented minority directors and gender diversity for directors will be
discussed in this paper to give a full reflection on the state of board diversity requirements.
Although concerns about systematic racism in the US have spread to Europe, this paper
will demonstrate that Europe’s recent push for diverse boards largely excludes racial and ethnic
diversity. Europe is much more focused on increasing gender diversity. Law makers and other
regulators have heard gender equity concerns from the public and many countries in the
European Union have stepped in to insure this happens, while the US push has largely been led
by stock exchanges or local governments.
II.

Corporate Board Diversity
In the US, approximately 20% of board members among the largest 3,000 companies are

women.8 A slightly higher 29% of board members in the S&P 500 are women.9 This number has
been steadily growing due in large part to the regulations that will be described below.
Additionally, while underrepresented ethnic and racial minorities make up about 40% of the US
population, they only make up about 12.5% of board members. Graph 1 below demonstrates the
growth that has occurred in this area over the course of 5 years.
Graph 1
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Lily Jamal, A Push To Get More Women On Corporate Boards Gains Momentum, NPR, Mar. 5, 2020.
Leslie P. Norton, Women Were 29% of U.S. Board Directors in 2020, Up From 19% in 2014, Barron’s, July 21,
2021.
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As Graph 1 illustrates, diversity on board varies greatly by industry, as some industries are
slower to make a shift than others. Along those same lines, different parts of the world are more
progressed in their acceptance of women and minorities on their corporate boards. In the
European Union (EU), 23.3% of board members of the largest companies are women,10 which is
certainly behind the S&P 500 numbers overall. However, the numbers are better for all European
Union companies with 35% of women on boards.11

10

Vêra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers, and Gender Equality, Gender Balance on Corporate
Boards: Europe is Cracking the Glass Ceiling (Fact Sheet), European Commission, July 2016.
11
Achieving Gender Equality In Decision-Making, European Women on Boards,
https://europeanwomenonboards.eu/.
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Most notably however, there is a lack of any significant data on racial or ethnic diversity
for European boards specifically. This data gap will be further explained when board diversity
requirements for the EU are examined below.
While this paper will discuss the relevant laws or stock exchange policies used to
promote board diversity, it is critical to note that most of the advances in board diversity are
being propelled by industry itself. Many companies are declining to work with other companies
that are not diverse. For example, in January 2020, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, David Solomon,
announced that they would not be taking any company public that did not have at least one
diverse board member.12 In 2021, this increased to two minimum diverse board members.
Solomon’s reasoning for the new policy is as follows:
This decision is rooted first and foremost in our conviction that companies
with diverse leadership perform better. Consider this: since 2016, US
companies that have gone public with at least one female board director
outperformed companies that do not, one year post-IPO. But in addition to
the real commercial benefits, it’s clear that changing the stereotypes
associated with corporate decision-making will have many positive effects
for society as a whole.13
Diversity in corporate governance decisions is important for many reasons, not least of
which are equity and improving shareholder value. Normatively, creating diverse environments
is important because it provides equal opportunity for all, especially those previously least likely
to get a seat at the table. Additionally, studies have shown that increased board diversity can help

David Solomon, Diverse Leadership Is Needed More Than Ever – Here’s What We’re Doing, LinkedIn, Jan. 23,
2020, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/diverse-leadership-needed-more-than-ever-heres-what-were-m-solomon/.
13
Id.
12
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to increase company performance.14 While reasoning for this correlation may vary, there are a
few widely accepted beliefs for this connection. First, corporate diversity allows the company to
understand a more diverse marketplace, particularly as markets expand. Second, variable
demographic ideas tend to inspire creativity and innovation at the corporate leadership level.
Third, a diverse group has better problem-solving skills and are better able to avoid the
phenomena of “group-think,” where a group of similar backgrounds are less likely to disagree
with each other, therefore leaving ideas half-tested. Lastly, firms with diverse leadership at
higher levels tend to inspire performance from diverse employees, which improves overall
company performance and decreases costly turnover.15
It is important to note that not everyone necessarily agrees with the importance of having
a diverse board of directors. For example, in a law review article titled The Danger of
Difference: Tensions in Directors' Views of Corporate Board Diversity, the authors take a much
more skeptical approach.16 Here, they start by noting that most directors and officers think that
board diversity is important. “But… it is very difficult for our respondents to provide
examples from their experience of when board diversity has made a tangible difference. We have
heard abundant stories about when other kinds of diversity–what might be called functional
diversity: different business backgrounds and skills, for example–have made a difference in how
effectively boards do their work. But pressing respondents for comparable stories about
demographic diversity has yielded very little beyond awkward silences.”17 This is only one

14

See generally David A. Carter, et. al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 The Financial
Review 33 (2003).
15
Id.
16
Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley & Lissa L. Broome, The Danger of Difference: Tensions in Directors'
Views of Corporate Board Diversity, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 919 (2013).
17
Id. at 920.
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example of the many opinions that counter the idea that diverse boards of directors actually help
to promulgate fiduciary duties.
III.

Diversity Laws for Corporate Boards of Directors
a. United States
The U.S. has no federal diversity requirements for corporate boards. Other corporate

governance issues are largely run through the states, and usually that state in which a company is
incorporate will govern the rules for the Board of Directors. However, when it comes to public
companies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays a very large regulatory role.
The SEC, however, has chosen not to play a role in establishing any quotas for board diversity
requirements. Instead, it has left this regulation up to the stock exchanges on which public
companies list. The SEC still must approve these listing rules before than can take effect for the
exchanges.
However, the SEC has stepped into this space to require the disclosure of certain
information. In 2009, the SEC promulgated rules requiring the disclosure of whether or how the
nominating committee of a board considers diversity when identifying potential candidates.18
However, companies were able to navigate around this requirement by using various definitions
of diversity. Therefore, in 2019 the SEC updated the disclosure requirement to include “that
when making a decision about nominating a particular person to be a director, to the extent that a
board considers that person's self-identified diversity characteristics such as race, religion, and
gender, the [SEC's] expectation was that ‘the company's discussion required by [the disclosure
regulation] would include, but not necessarily be limited to, identifying those characteristics and

18

Shorter (2019).
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how they were considered.’”19 More recently, states like California have decided to step into this
role as well, which do not require SEC approval, and will be discussed below.
i. NASDAQ
The Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) is one of the major American Stock exchanges and
has been the most significant exchange in terms of encouraging board diversity. On December 1,
2020, Nasdaq filed a proposal for the new rule with the SEC.20 This rule, Rule 5605(f): Diverse
Board Representation, under Rule 5605(f)(2) would require that companies listed on the Nasdaq
to have at least two diverse directors, including one self-identified female director and one
director who self-identifies as an underrepresented minority or as LGBTQ+. “‘Underrepresented
Minority’” means an individual who self-identifies as one or more of the following: Black or
African American, Hispanic or Latinx, Asian, Native American or Alaska Native, Native
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or Two or More Races or Ethnicities.”21 “‘LGBTQ+’ means an
individual who self-identifies as any of the following: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or as a
member of the queer community.”22
Rule 5606(f)(2) can alternatively be satisfied through disclosure, as described in Rule
5606(f)(3). This rule gives the option for “Alternative Public Disclosure” if a company does not
meet these diversity requirements. For this disclosure, a listed company must specify which Rule
5606(f)(2) requirements are applicable and explain its reasons for not having met the

19

Id.
David A. Bell, et. al., SEC Adopts Nasdaq Rules on Board Diversity, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance, Mar. 21, 2022, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/19/sec-adopts-nasdaq-rules-on-boarddiversity/.
21
Rule 5606(f)(2)(B)(ii), Corporate Governance Requirements, The NASDAQ Stock Market.
22
Id.
20
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requirements. This disclosure must then be “provided in advance of the Company’s next annual
meeting of shareholders.”23
Rule 5606(f) has several exceptions, including those that were added on February 26,
2021, when the proposal was amended to lessen the stringency of some of the initial
requirements. For example, companies with five or fewer board members are only required to
have one diverse board member (or otherwise disclose). There is also a “phase-in period” for
companies that are newly listed before they are required to meet the diversity numbers or provide
disclosure. Lastly, and most relevant to this paper’s later discussion, Foreign Issuers must, or
disclose why it doesn’t, have two diverse board members, one of which is female, though no
specification is made for other minority groups.24 This means that the board could have two
female directors and still satisfy the requirement, rather than needing an Underrepresented
Minority or LGBTQ+ director.
ii. NYSE
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has taken a very different approach from Nasdaq and
California, as discussed below. In 2019, they named an “NYSE Board Advisory Council” made
up of more than twenty25 CEOs of listed companies.26 Their goal is to “address the critical need
for inclusive leadership by connecting diverse candidates with companies seeking new
directors.”27 This council would not prescribe any minimum diversity requirements or require
any disclosures from companies. Rather, the idea was to “use personal networks of those CEOs
to identify [diverse] board candidates. The members of the Council would both educate and

23

Id.
Id.
25
Originally, nineteen.
26
Stewart Landefeld, Board Diversity: A Comparison Between the NYSE & Nasdaq Now, Public Chatter, Nov. 1,
2021.
27
Initiative to Advance Board Diversity, The New York Stock Exchange,
https://www.nyse.com/boardadvisory/about-the-council.
24
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advocate for those identified candidates and introduce them through a series of proposed events
to NYSE-listed companies.”28
iii. California (SB 826)
In 2018, California signed Senate Bill 826 (SB 826) into law.29 This law, called Women
on Boards, is aimed at advancing “equitable gender representation on California corporate
boards.”30 This law requires that all public companies headquartered within the state meet a
minimum number of females on their Board of Directors.31 All boards would be required to have
one female director. If the board has five directors, then there must be two female directors. If
the board has six or more directors, then at least three of them must be female.32 Markedly, there
was a time period for phasing in these higher number requirements, but that phased approach is
now complete, so these are the requirements as they stand in 2022.
SB 826 is distinguishable from the US stock exchange requirements in a few different
ways. First and probably most significantly, it is a state law and not a listing requirement. While
it only applies to public companies, it still seems to have a very broad reach because it applies to
companies that are not incorporated within the state. Many of the large public companies that are
headquartered in California are incorporated in Delaware.33 This large reach has led to some
backlash and legal battles which will be discussed below.
Next, SB 826 contains fines for violations with no disclosure option. A violation occurs
for “each director seat required by this section to be held by a female, which is not held by a
female during at least a portion of a calendar year.”34 The first violation incurs a fine of $100,000

28

Landefeld (2021).
Women on Boards, California Secretary of State, https://www.sos.ca.gov/business-programs/women-boards.
30
Id.
31
CA Senate Bill No. 826, Chapter 954, Corporations – Board of Directors.
32
Id.
33
Delaware is the most common state in which to incorporate a company.
34
CA Senate Bill No. 826, Chapter 954, Corporations – Board of Directors.
29
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and each subsequent violation incurs a $300,000 fine.35 Fine values are not predetermined for
stock exchange violation. It is also very significant that there are no disclosure options, meaning
they cannot opt to have no women on the board and simply file a disclosure to avoid being in
violation with the law. Therefore, this law has more bite than the exchange listing requirements.
iv. California (AB 979)
More recently than the passing of SB 826, in 2020, California signed Assembly Bill No.
979 (AB 979) into law.36 This bill follows a very similar structure to SB 826, but instead of
mandating gender diversity for corporate boards headquartered in California, it mandates a
minimum number of directors “from an underrepresented community.”37 This means “an
individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific
Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaskan Native, or who self-identifies as gay,
lesbian, bisexual, or transgender.”38 The number requirements vary slightly from SB 826. A
board with four or fewer directors is required to have one director from an underrepresented
community, while a board with five to nine directors is required to have two, and a board with
nine or more directors must have three.39
The definition of diversity in both California bills is notably different from that of Nasdaq
Rule 5605(f). California passed these laws first, which perhaps explains why the gender diversity
requirement came into effect before the underrepresented community requirement. Nasdaq
implemented this rule after both California bills were introduced, which might have allowed
them to have the foresight to adopt both measures at the same time. From a structural

35

Id.
CA Assembly Bill No. 979, Chapter 316, Corporations: boards of directors: underrepresented communities.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
36
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perspective, this has a big effect. To comply with California law, a Board with nine directors
could have three women who are also from underrepresented communities or LGBT and satisfy
both SB 826 and AB 979. On the other hand, Rule 5606(f) requires two diverse directors, so one
person could not fulfill both requirements. However, because California requires larger numbers
of diverse board members in the first place, this distinction is unlikely to have a large effect.
It is also notable that aside from the structure of the law, Nasdaq has a textually more
expansive definition of diversity. It includes people of “Two or More Races or Ethnicities” in the
mix, as well as those that identify more generally as a “member of the queer community.” AB
979 fails to explicitly include either of these groups. While this may be a problem in the text, it is
unlikely to be a cause for concern in practice. For instance, it seems unfathomable that California
would even attempt to fine a company that otherwise satisfies the requirement through counting
a queer person as diverse. In practice, it seems only logical that the more expansive definition
available in Rule 5606(f) will also apply in California law.
b. European Union
As previously mentioned, EU numbers on board diversity tend to focus exclusively on
gender, with the exception for nationality discussed below. In Europe and the European Union
more specifically, it is common for governments to be involved with implementing board
diversity requirements, rather than for these requirements to be implemented by stock exchanges
as seen in the US, with the exception of California. Instead, the European stock exchanges seem
to utilize indexes to highlight investor preference for diverse companies. For example, the largest
European Union stock exchange Euronext, which is headquartered in Paris, has gone this route.40
The Euronext Eurozone Diversity & Governance 40 EW is an index that is designed to show

40

Euronext Eurozone Diversity & Governance 40 EW, Euronext: Index Rule Book, 21-01 (June 2021).
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price level trends while focusing on diversity and governance measures.41 These indexes rely on
the investors placing a very real financial advantage on companies that value diversity in their
directors as well as other ESG measures. This investor pressure could very well be the key driver
in improving diversity numbers. However, various European government entities have chosen to
step in as well.
i. European Governments Intervention
In 2010, the European Commission created the Strategy for Equality between Women
and Men.42 This strategy noted a lack of equality in decision-making at all levels, and
specifically noted that “[w]omen represent only one in ten board members of the largest publicly
listed companies in the EU.”43 The strategy said it would address this by considering targeted
initiatives to create gender equality in decision-making at the highest levels.44 The first
“initiative,” with a rather broad interpretation of the word, was created in 2011. This was the
“Women on Board Pledge for Europe” which was a voluntary pledge that companies could
make.45 This effort proved to be largely unsuccessful.46
After the failure of the voluntary pledge, the European Commission decided to take a
different approach. In 2012, they submitted a proposal for a directive for gender balance on
boards for companies listed on public stock exchanges.47 “The proposal set the aim of a
minimum of 40% of non-executive members of the under-represented sex on company boards, to

41

Id.
Strategy for equality between women and men, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Brussels, 21.9.2010, Com 491.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Women on Boards in Europe from A Snail’s Pace to a Giant Leap?: EWL Report on Progress, Gaps and Good
Practice, European Women’s Lobby (Feb. 2012).
46
Jourová (2016).
47
Gender Balance on Boards, Legislative Train (Feb. 2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislativetrain/theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-gender-balance-on-boards.
42
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be achieved by 2020 in the private sector and by 2018 in public-sector companies.”48 The
proposal also described the ways companies should make board appointment decisions. They
should “make appointments on the basis of pre-established, clear and neutral criteria. If
candidates were equally qualified, advantage would be given to the under-represented sex.”49 If
companies did not reach the 40% goal, then they would have to follow a series of procedures,
penalties, and disclosures in an effort to get there eventually.50 While this proposal was adopted
by the European Parliament in 2013, one can see that the 40% mark has certainly not been
reached. This is because countries are sovereign and can decide what laws from the European
Commission they chose to implement.
Despite this guidance, there are still many countries in the EU that have not adopted
similar rules. Out of the 27 countries in the EU, 19 of them have no quotas in place for board
gender diversity.51 Of the countries that do have quotas of some form in place, they chose to
qualify it in a variety of ways. To give a couple of examples, Austria has a 35% quota that only
applies to state owned companies.52 In France, the 40% quota applies to non-executive directors
of large listed and unlisted companies.53 The Netherlands has a 30% target with “comply or
explain” requirements, but no punishments, similar to the NASDAQ rules previously
discussed.54 Lastly, Spain has a 40% target that applies to large state owned companies, but has
no sanctions and therefore tends to be viewed as more of a recommendation.55

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
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Jourová (2016).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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The European Commission has also helped to establish organizations that can work to
achieve gender equity in decision-making positions. The European Women on Boards
organization is co-funded by the European Union and has a mission to help solve the problem by
enhancing networking opportunities for senior women, and providing training and mentoring
opportunities.56 This approach seems to be rather similar to that taken by the NYSE. Both have
created groups that are intended to build a broader network that can identify and aid women in
breaking into the current structure, without working to update the structure that has not allowed
women or other underrepresented groups onto corporate boards in proportionate numbers. While
this approach is valuable, it seems to have less impact so far on directing change.
ii. Switzerland
Switzerland is only tangentially impacted by European Union regulations to impact
corporate governance. While not a member of the EU, the Swiss financial industry works with
EU clients and networks very frequently. Its culture is heavily impacted by that of the
surrounding countries, and it can provide some interesting insight into the influence of corporate
board diversity regulations. Switzerland is known for its banking industry, one that is extremely
male dominated. Furthermore, women only received the right to vote in Switzerland in 1971,
many decades later than equally economically developed countries. According to the Gender
Diversity Index (GDI), a study completed by the European Women on Boards Organization,
Switzerland has a score of 0.43, which is the fourth lowest of all 19 European countries that were
studied.57 The GDI takes into account other senior positions as well, including officers and board
committees, which are outside the scope of this paper. Of the 53 companies in the study, only 4

56

Achieving Gender Equality.
Women on Boards and in Corporate Leadership Gender Diversity Index 2021, European Women on Boards,
https://europeanwomenonboards.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Switzerland-Country-report-2021-GDI.pdf.
57
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of them had a female chair of the board and 14 of them had no women at the executive level of
the company.
The Swiss Government has made attempts to improve these numbers and encourage more
gender representation on corporate boards. In September 2020, the Swiss Federal Council made
a decision that would enter force in the beginning of 2021. This rule required large companies to
have 30% women on their board of directors and 20% women on their executive board. This
applies to “[c]ompanies that in two consecutive years have a balance sheet of more than 20
million Swiss francs (about US$22 million) or whose sales revenue exceeds 40 million Swiss
francs, or that have an annual average of more than 250 full-time positions are required to
include information on the gender quota in their annual remuneration report. If the quota is not
met, the companies are required to comply or to explain why, and to describe the measures that
have been and will be taken to increase the numbers for the underrepresented gender.”58 These
requirements however will not be in effect until 2026,59 so it is yet to be seen how effective they
will be at changing board composition. However, what we have seen is that as the goals of 30%
and 20% come closer, the growth of women in these positions has slowed, as seen in Graph 2
below.60
Graph 261
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Switzerland: Gender Quotas for Boards of Large Companies to Take Effect January 1, 2021, Library of Congress
(Sept. 29, 2020).
59
Id.
60
Diversity: 2021 Switzerland Spencer Stuart Board Index, Spencer Stuart, https://www.spencerstuart.com/researchand-insight/switzerland-board-index/diversity.
61
Id.
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Switzerland is also home to the SIX Swiss Exchange, its largest stock exchange.62 This
stock exchange is similar to EuroNext and other European stock exchanges in that it has largely
conducted any influence on diversity in corporate governance through indexes. The Spencer
Stewart Board Index has reviewed swiss companies on the Swiss Market Index (SMI), the most
followed index in the country that is comprised of about 20 of the largest SIX Swiss stocks. As
previously noted, there is a data gap in terms of board ethnic and racial diversity in European
companies. One of these reasons is because the US and Europe have very different ideas of what
it means to be diverse in this manner. Spencer Stuart analyzed foreign directors included in the
SMI, and defined foreign investors that have a nationality different from that of the company.63
Just because their nationality differs, does not mean race or ethnicity does.
Graph 3

62
63

SIX Swiss Exchange, SIX, https://www.six-group.com/en/products-services/the-swiss-stock-exchange.html.
Diversity (2021).
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Graph 3 above illustrates the findings of Spencer Stuart.64 They consider the SMI to be highly
diverse because 57.9% of directors are foreign.65 This helps to give a better picture of the sorts of
cultural diversity that being discussed for European boards.
In December 2021, I had the opportunity to travel to Switzerland with the University of
Chicago on the International Immersion Program Trip. While on the trip, we met with members
of various international organizations, corporations, and law firms. While the trip was very
enjoyable, I also had the opportunity to witness a relative lack in diversity at the board or even
managerial levels of major companies. When I asked about this, most companies would
acknowledge that it was something they were working on, but pointed to childcare as the lead
problem for this. They said that because childcare was so expensive, once a woman had a child,
the costs of the childcare were prohibitive to returning to work. Therefore, there were not enough
women available to be elevated to the status of a board member or even a partner in a law firm. It

64
65

Id.
Id.
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was also rather unconceivable in a heterosexual relationship that the man would be the one to
choose to stay home with the children.
Furthermore, I asked about racial and ethnic diversity at various corporations. It became
apparent immediately that “diversity” does not necessarily mean the same thing because unless
race or ethnicity was specifically mentioned; it was assumed that I was referring to gender.
However, once the meaning came across, they did explain that the concept was very different in
Europe as discussed above. One white man at a law firm in Zurich explained that he counted as
diverse for their numbers because he was German. Clearly, this diversity is not the same as the
numbers we measure in the US, as demonstrated by Graph 3 above.
IV.

Comparative Findings
a. Gender
Overall, the US and Europe have taken different approaches to promoting gender

diversity on corporate boards. The US has largely taken the approach of letting stock exchanges
create listing disclosure rules in order to promote diversity on corporate boards, which is then
permitted by the SEC. In Europe on the other hand, stock exchanges are generally not as large or
powerful, so they tend to have less influence. Instead, most of the requirements, if any, come
from government laws. We’ve seen California begin to adopt this approach, but federalism
concerns make this more difficult in the US.
One problem with allowing states to individually create diversity requirements would be
the potential for overlapping and conflicting regulation. For example, California’s laws apply to
all companies that are physically headquartered in the state. Many of these companies are
actually incorporated in Delaware. If Delaware were to pass a law with different quotas for
incorporated companies, then the corporation would have to comply with whichever rule has the
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higher standard. On the other hand, if Delaware were to pass a law saying that gender or
race/ethnicity was not allowed to be considered for incorporated companies when selecting board
members, then the laws would be in conflict. The company would necessarily be in violation of
one of the laws. For this reason, and others as well, the California regulations have seen
extensive litigation procedures following their implementation. Currently, the cases are in
various litigation stages, including on appeal with the Ninth Circuit.66
This same concern could arise in Europe if there were to be a conflict between the stock
exchanges and country laws. Therefore, when it comes to board diversity requirements, I think it
would be best to have one regulator. A discussion of the normative value of these requirements
will follow below. However, either the stock exchanges or the government should regulate, but
not both. If the cost of regulation and compliance gets too high, there will be too much
inefficiency built into the system and stockholders will ultimately be injured. ESG is supposed to
benefit the stockholders by creating more value. Inefficient regulations, and in particular
overregulation, can decrease that same value.
b. Race/Ethnicity
As mentioned, the concept of racial and ethnic diversity varies greatly between the US
and Europe. There are many different factors that contribute to this, not least of all is that Europe
tends to be less diverse in this regard. There are larger racial and ethnic minority populations in
the US.67 At the same time, the US does a better job of acknowledging our own systemic racism.
Despite many systemic racism deniers within the US and the presence of Black Lives Matter
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protests in Europe during the summer of 2020, the US as a whole does a better job than Europe
acknowledging the systemic racism within.
While it is easy for Europeans to acknowledge and cry out against police brutality in the
US, it can be more difficult for them to acknowledge the problems they have at home. This is
seen through the lack of diverse ethnicities in leadership positions in Europe and even more so
through the lack of data on the subject. By not having the same laws regarding diverse racial and
ethnic minorities on corporate boards as they have for women, there is an implicit
acknowledgement that it is not as important in their culture. If diverse boards are supposed to
help the company by coming up with creative solutions and avoiding group-think, then including
racially and ethnically diverse people would be just as important as including women. However,
Europe has an often unspoken history of making it hard for immigrants to assimilate and
therefore difficult to gain decision-making positions in corporations.
V.

Conclusion
The ultimate question is if these regulations to increase board diversity, either through

stock exchanges or through local or national governments, are ultimately helping or hurting the
cause. One view is that these regulations help open the door for qualified candidates that have
previously been prevented from getting a seat at the table. Another view is that if corporations
truly do better financially with diverse boards, the market will find a way to adjust for this on its
own. While maybe true in the long run, I do not think this is reason for inaction now. If the
market naturally corrected in a timely manner, minorities would already have a larger place in
boards of directors and executive positions. Regulations from governing bodies are needed to
bypass the explicit or implicit bias at existing companies that have prevented minorities from
being elevated to these positions sooner. While the strategies implemented in both the United
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States and Europe have begun improvements within this area, more needs to be done to
normalized diverse candidates on corporate boards of directors.
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